A Realistic Roadmap for West Asian Security

The military escalations of recent months across West Asia have demolished a dangerous, long-standing illusion: the belief that stability can be purchased through foreign military bases and sophisticated weapons acquisitions, or that sovereign nations can be bullied into submission through economic warfare and airstrikes. An equally perilous illusion has persisted among many European and regional actors. They have historically acted – or failed to act – on the assumption that Iran can be trapped by the United States and its partners in Europe and the region in a permanent securitization cycle of diplomatic isolation, economic strangulation and outright military aggression, while they remain insulated, quietly celebrating and pursuing their own economic development and prosperity.

It is time to acknowledge reality. Decades of “maximum pressure” and military strikes have failed to eliminate Iranian resilience or erase its technological advances. More fundamentally, they have demonstrated that zero-sum approaches to international politics inevitably produce negative-sum outcomes. Security and sustainable development are fundamentally indivisible, collective realities. Insecurity and anti-security dynamics cannot be neatly contained; they inevitably cross borders, as recent regional developments have so starkly demonstrated. No country can build a secure, prosperous oasis on the shifting sands of a neighbor’s engineered instability. To escape this perpetual cycle of crisis, we need a paradigm shift—one that replaces the exhausted grammar of coercion with an indigenous architecture of collective security.

At the root of the current stalemate lies the “securitization cycle.” For decades, the United States and Israel have framed Iran not as a normal international actor with legitimate security requirements, but as an existential threat requiring extraordinary, extra-legal measures. This narrative has served to justify unilateral sanctions, Security Council censures, extraterritorial economic warfare and direct military aggression.

Predictably, this campaign has triggered a self-fulfilling prophecy. Confronted by hostile encirclement and economic warfare, Iran has been compelled to adopt defensive countermeasures. It has bolstered its conventional deterrence and expanded its nuclear enrichment to demonstrate that coercion will not yield compliance. Adversaries have cynically seized upon these reactive, defensive steps to validate their original accusations and escalate pressure further.

It has been verified time and again by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran never sought nuclear weapons. Yet, extra-regional powers persistently accused it of doing so and imposed punishments that far exceeded measures taken against those who actually developed nuclear arsenals. This has created a widespread impression in Iran that conformity with international non-proliferation norms reaps reverse consequences. Breaking this vicious cycle requires learning from past mistakes and reversing the logic of interaction. If the United States and its partners wish to ensure that their behavior does not prompt a reconsideration of long-standing Iranian nuclear doctrine, they must immediately cease their pursuit of regime collapse, including through economic, political, diplomatic and military warfare. Trust cannot be rebuilt on unilateral demands, but on respect for the dignity and welfare of Iran and its people.

The failure of zero-sum thinking in the nuclear file is now self-evident. The West’s fixation on maximalist restrictions and punitive measures has repeatedly collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. During the grueling years of negotiations that culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), I witnessed firsthand how a shift from zero-sum demands to positive-sum compromises could unlock what had long seemed an intractable deadlock. Spending countless hours in Vienna and Geneva with my counterparts, we proved that diplomatic willpower and mutual respect could overcome decades of deep-seated animosity. Yet, that brief prevalence of a realistic, cooperative, positive-sum approach was tragically short-lived. The JCPOA ultimately fell victim to the resumption of coercive habits. Old habits die hard. The United States never brought itself to the full implementation of its commitments, holding on to the illusion that sanctions and pressure must be maintained. Europe, which considered the JCPOA as its historic diplomatic achievement allowed it to die through opportunistic inaction and alliance inclinations. The JCPOA failed because the United States reverted back to its habit of imposition, forcing Iran to revert back to its habit of resistance. In this midst, Europe painfully caused the early demise of this moment of international cooperation by abandoning its habit of promoting compromise and respect for international law in favor of extraneous political exigencies.

If we are to avert a change of Iranian nuclear doctrine and move beyond the current nuclear deadlock, the nuclear issue must be transformed from a perennial source of crisis into a catalyst for regional confidence-building and scientific cooperation. Instead of making dangerously impossible demands of Iran to abolish its nuclear program, the global community must bring itself to accept the now-proven reality that Iranian science and know-how cannot be obliterated by any amount of aerial bombardment or environmentally catastrophic sabotage. The most realistic course of action is to ensure that this indigenous capability is applied to peaceful collaborations geared toward addressing real-life technological challenges, from water scarcity to medical isotopes.
This is the central objective of the proposed Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Advancement (MENARA) – an Arabic word fittingly meaning “lighthouse.” Rather than treating civilian nuclear energy through the prism of fear, MENARA provides a multilateral framework open to all states in the Middle East and North Africa that commit to the non-possession of nuclear weapons. Through MENARA, regional states can pool scientific expertise, collaborate on peaceful applications and establish mutual regional verification mechanisms.

To address the current stalemate on Iranian enrichment, the West and particularly Europe must bring itself to the realization that Iran has earned this right and capability at a very high price that can never be wished or bombed away. Thus, a multilateral fuel-enrichment consortium may be the only remaining window for a diplomatic solution. Rather than entertaining unworkable demands for zero enrichment, Iran should be encouraged to partner with interested Persian Gulf littoral states, alongside international associates, to participate directly in shared enrichment facilities based in Iran and other regional states. Such a consortium would provide an ironclad structural guarantee of transparency and non-diversion, secure fuel supplies for civilian power needs across the region, and turn a contested national capability into a shared, mutually monitored regional enterprise.
A durable nuclear understanding cannot survive in a geopolitical vacuum. It must be embedded within a broader regional security network architecture. West Asia has suffered for generations from the fallacy that national security requires military supremacy over one’s neighbors. True security is indivisible; the strategic objective of regional states must shift from building “strong states” to cultivating a “strong region.”

The institutional platform for this transformation should be a multi-layered regional cooperation and security network designed to replace enmity with amity and empathy. This starts with institutionalized dialogue among the eight Persian Gulf littoral states, together with Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Syria and Turkey. Far from operating in a legal vacuum, this initiative can be formally anchored in the long-neglected mandate of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, Paragraph 8, which tasks the UN Secretary-General with exploring regional measures to enhance stability and security.

Under this international umbrella, the network can establish practical confidence-building measures, including binding non-aggression arrangements that prohibit the use of force and deny territory, airspace, or logistical access to hostile third parties. Moreover, building on Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), regional countries can develop mechanisms to ensure freedom of navigation. These mechanisms must be premised on the self-evident imperative that sentinel states of global arteries, such as the Strait of Hormuz, are not themselves deprived of the benefits of passage due to extraterritorial sanctions. Sanctions and foreign naval armadas are inherently destabilizing. Guaranteeing reciprocal benefit for all is the only sustainable method of ensuring long-term maritime stability. The proposed regional network should also coordinate collective responses to the environmental crises threatening the livability of this region, including water scarcity, land erosion, desertification and climate change. Finally, a regional development fund may be established to support post-conflict reconstruction.
We all live in a post-polar world where traditional global hegemonies have eroded, and power is diffused across multiple actors and thematic networks. In this emerging landscape, Europe – and Germany in particular – faces a critical strategic and economic choice.

Germany has traditionally had fewer entanglements and energy dependencies in the southern Persian Gulf. In a future cooperative West Asian environment, Germany is uniquely positioned to act as a vital, non-hegemonic partner for regional development, complementing the economic engagements of actors like China. To realize this potential, Berlin is well advised to escape its current diplomatic inertia. The foreign policies of post-Merkel administrations have distanced Germany from the diplomatic prestige it enjoyed in the past, reducing its role to a passive spectator.

For too long, European capitals have functioned as mere followers of Washington’s escalatory cycles, prioritizing transatlantic alignment over their own clear economic, energy, and migration interests. Yet when conflict erupts in the Persian Gulf, it is Europe – not the United States – that bears the immediate fallout of refugee flows, supply chain disruptions, and energy volatility. Europe’s comparative advantage lies not in the projection of coercive military force, but in promoting respect for international law, normative diplomacy, global consensus-building, conflict resolution and development partnerships. Recognizing that durable security cannot be achieved through perpetual confrontation, Europe can help dismantle the securitization trap by actively backing indigenous regional dialogue and inclusive networks.

Germany has the potential to correct its current course and lead the global support structure for this regional endeavor, thereby reclaiming its sovereign diplomatic legacy and helping build a stable, prosperous neighbor for Europe. The alternative is continued subservience to a policy of permanent war and instability. This course serves neither German, European, nor global interests, nor the cause of peace in West Asia. It does not even promote the long-term interests of the United States. Indeed, Donald Trump himself ran on a platform of ‘Making America Great Again’ centered on ‘draining the swamp’ and extricating the United States – and, by extension, the global community – from the quagmire of forever wars.

*Mohammad Javad Zarif is Associate Professor of Global Studies at the University of Tehran and founder and president of Possibilities Architects (PAIAB Institute). He previously served as Iran’s Vice President, Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to the United Nations.